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Abstract—Autonomous vehicles are complex safety
critical systems that operate in uncertain and dynamic
environment. To ensure safe behavior, possibly at all times
in all possible situations, they must be aware of themselves,
their environment and take decisions accordingly. To this
end, safety monitoring is a valuable technique that allows
the vehicle to observe its behavior and trigger corrective
measures in case of any violations. In this paper, we present
a systematic specification for such a safety monitor. The
monitor is a collection of safety rules that are obtained
by performing hazard and risk analysis based on the
operational mode and environmental situation of the vehicle
at the time of the hazard. The rules act like safety
constraints for the vehicle and in case of a violation
generate a trigger to bring vehicle back to a safe state.
Keywords: safety monitoring, safety monitor, safety
rules, autonomous vehicles
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous vehicles are complex safety critical
systems that operate in diverse and dynamic
environment. Due to complexity of the system and
unpredictability of the environment, it is challenging to
anticipate all potential system behaviors at design time.
As a consequence, it becomes difficult to determine
which system behavior is appropriate in which situation
at runtime. Under such circumstances, one way to
ensure safe behavior is to supervise the vehicle by
observing the failures causing hazardous situations and
handling them at the time of its execution.
As defined in [1], safety is ”the absence of catastrophic
consequences on the user(s) and the environment”. Based
on this definition, safe behavior of an autonomous
vehicle can be defined as the capability of the vehicle
to accomplish its tasks (e.g. driving), make decisions
according to the changes in itself or the environment
and at the same time ensure safety. The magnitude
of safe behavior depends upon the level of autonomy,
likelihood of human intervention and the environmental
context. For instance, in presence of a human driver,
a system malfunction can be tolerated by switching-off
the function and giving driver the complete control of the
vehicle. However, in case of a fully-autonomous vehicle,
in the absence of a human assistance, the vehicle must
be capable of detecting and tolerating a safety critical
situation on its own.
Safety critical situations can arise due to random
errors in hardware components (e.g. sensors) or due to
unsuitable environmental conditions at runtime. These
situations often cause an unplanned behavior of the
vehicle, which in a certain situation could result in a
hazard, or even an accident, if left undetected. Since,
it is unknown at design time in which situation which
random error would occur and lead to a hazardous event,
to maintain safe behavior, it is essential to be aware about
it on the first place.
This can be achieved by monitoring the vehicle by
means of a safety monitor that observes its behavior
and trigger corrective measures in case of violations.
Monitoring safety of the vehicle at runtime complements
traditional safety assurance as it aids in finding design
time as well as runtime defects that could potentially
occur in software or hardware due to unexpected
environmental conditions or runtime faults [2].
This way safety monitoring acts as a fault tolerance
technique where, the fundamental task of the monitor
is to continually administer the system for violations
and bring it back to a safe state in the event of safety
critical deviations [3]. A safety monitor, sometimes
coined differently as safety manager [4] or safety bag
[5], equipped autonomous vehicle acts like a self-aware
system [6] capable of altering its behavior in response
to the change in the environment or its own components
to maintain safety.
In this paper, we present a systematic procedure for
specifying such a service safety monitor, a sub-module
of a service monitor, that monitors the vehicle for
safety critical deviations using a set of safety rules.
These rules are derived by performing hazard analysis
of the deviations occurring in vehicle services in a
particular scenario during a specific operational mode.
The monitor ensures safe behavior of the vehicle by
triggering corresponding corrective measures in case of
detected deviations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
In Section II, we present the definitions used in
our approach followed by a detailed and a stepwise
specification of the safety the monitor. In Section
III, we conclude this paper summarising the proposed
monitoring approach.
II. SAFETY MONITORING APPROACH
As demonstrated in Fig. 1 (a), safety monitor
encompasses three modules: a System Service Monitor
(SSM), Configuration Evaluation (CE) and a Knowledge
Base (KB). SSM is the principal module of the safety
monitor. It is a collection of safety rules which are
obtained at design time via Hazard and Risk Analysis
(HARA) [11]. Each rule represents planned behavior
of the component and its corresponding potential
safety-critical deviations.
Fig. 1. Safety Monitor Specification and Monitoring Procedure
The primary task of SSM is to monitor these
deviations as they occur and trigger CE for a safety
measure. The main goal of CE module is to evaluate
the safety of the vehicle in accordance to the currently
activated operational mode and take safety measures,
if necessary. This is accomplished by carrying out
a runtime risk analysis [10] based on the system
information stored in the KB that acts like a knowledge
repository that assists CE with system evaluation at
runtime. The risk assessment procedure implemented in
CE is out of scope of this paper, and thus not discussed
further.
A definitive step-wise procedure of runtime safety
monitoring is described in Fig. 1 (b). Safety monitor
implements a knowledge-based system monitoring
which can be outlined as a sequence of four consecutive
computations: Monitor-Analyze-Evaluate-Respond
(MAER). The monitoring and analyses is performed by
SSM. In case of safety-critical deviations, SSM triggers
CE that evaluates risk associated with the vehicle and
takes safety measures as a response to those deviations.
By means of a safety monitor we employ runtime
monitoring to ensure safe operation of a vehicle
(or its components). This is achieved by actively
monitoring the currently activated configuration for
safety critical deviations in its services. In this manner,
our monitoring approach does not aim at fault prevention
or fault removal but, at fault tolerance by detecting
them and prompting safety measures to avoid any
unsafe situations. The behavior of the monitor is a
declarative collection of safety rules, where each rule
represents the safety status of the vehicle and its
corresponding restorative measure. To derive these rules
and a systematic specification of our service monitor, we
perform the following procedure:
I. Firstly, we determine all operational modes of the
vehicle along with their potential configurations that
can be activated during operation.
II. Secondly, we ascertain complete set of services
associated with each configuration for their
respective operational modes.
III. Thirdly, we perform hazards and risk analysis
to identify the potential deviations in services
that could result in hazardous situations during
operation.
IV. Lastly, we assign these deviations an integrity level
based on the risk associated them. We then analyse
dependencies between services and their deviations
for a given operational mode and environmental
situation, followed by constructing safety statuses
and corresponding measures to form the rules.
Step I. Operational Modes and Configurations: First
and foremost, we begin with determining all possible
operational modes (OPM) that a vehicle is capable
of. An OPM represents the level of autonomy with
which system is operating. We classify them into:
fully-autonomous (AM), semi-autonomous (SM) and
manual mode (MM). A fully-autonomous mode is where
all configurations of the vehicle are capable of carrying
out all operations automatically i.e. without the presence
of a human driver. However, in case of the other two,
presence of a human driver is always required.
Subsequently, we determine the potential
configurations for each operational mode. At the
moment, all configurations are pre-determined at
design-time. Each mode can have multiple configurations
out of which only one can be activated at a time.
Normally, configurations differ from each another in
terms of functionality or redundancy. For instance,
in case of Tractor Implement Automation (TIA) [8],
a tractor (Trac) can have separate configurations for
different implements1 e.g. a baler or a harvester, or
1An implement is a device or component that is attached to a tractor
to perform a specific task like: a harvester for harvesting purposes.
Fig. 2. Operational Modes & Configurations of TIA Vehicle
redundant configurations in case of graceful degradation
or maintainance purposes. Similarly, implements like
baler (Bal) and swath scanner (SwSc) can have multiple
configurations in different operational modes for baling
specific tasks.{
TracAMCf1 , T rac
SM
Cf1 , ...
}
= Bal TracOPMipotCfj ,{
BalAMCf1 , Bal
AM
Cf2 , Bal
SM
Cf1 , ...
}
= BalOPMmpotCfn
(1)
Identification and categorization of the potential
configurations based on their operational modes has
a twofold advantage: On the one hand, it assists
in ascertaining the possible collaborations profiles
(CollabProf ) between multiple configurations of the
vehicle and its implements in different operational
modes. On the other hand, it aids in an intensive
hazard analysis. This due to the fact that, both the risk,
associated with a particular deviation, and the magnitude
of the corresponding safety measures to ensure safety,
depends upon the activated configuration and the mode
in which vehicle is operating.
〈TracAMCf1 :: BalAMCf1 :: SwScAMCf1〉 ∈ CollabProf1,
{CollabProf1, CollabProf2, ...} = CollabProfnBal
(2)
In TIA, for each implement, there exist at least
one collaboration profile to carry out the implement
specific task. The equations above manifest an exemplary
collaboration profile that consists of configurations of a
Trac, Bal and a SwSc collaborating together to render
baling. In this case, the tractor as well as the baler
support multiple operational modes and configurations.
Thus there exist multiple potential collaboration profiles
for carrying out baling specific tasks.
Step II. Services and Potential Configurations:
Once we have all operational modes along with their
potential configurations, the next step is to determine
services associated with each of those configurations.
Each configuration has a set of services that includes
both required and provided services. Required services
(rs) are the ones that a configuration receives from
another components, whereas provided services (ps)
are the services that a configuration renders for other
components and their configurations.
{vehspdrs, steerangps, ...} = TracAMCf1 (3)
The reason behind ascertaining all services of a
configuration is to filter the safety critical services
from the non-safety critical ones. Typically, deviation
in a required service influences the provided service
thereby, causing an unplanned behavior of the entire
configuration. For instance, a deviation in the speed
sensor of the tractor results in an incorrect value of
vehicle speed (vehspd). As a consequence, the tractor
doesn’t decelerate while steering thereby, loosing control
over itself. However, it is also possible that the provided
service suffers a deviation despite of no deviation(s)
in the required services. Regardless of whether the
deviation is at the required service or at the end of
provided service, it results in an unsafe and unplanned
behavior of the configuration thereby, in a hazardous
situation of the entire vehicle.
Step III. Hazard and Risk Analysis: After identifying
the set of safety critical services, we perform hazard and
risk analysis to analyse their possible deviations and their
consequences. We classify these deviations based on
their discrepancies attributed to time, value or provision.
For instance, in case of a tractor, if the service vehspd
must be generated within 10ms from request time, but is
generated after a delay of 2ms, then the service suffers
a deviation attributed to time. In a fully-autonomous
mode, even such small time-deviation might result in a
hazardous situation as the tractor is unaware of its own
speed for this duration. Moreover, if the speed generated
after the delay (i.e. at 12ms) is incorrect, the safety of the
vehicle, along with its implements, gets more vulnerable.
A particular deviation in a service can have
different severities based on the operational mode and
the environmental situation during vehicle operation.
For instance, an incorrect value of vehspd in an
autonomous mode is highly critical compared to in the
semi-autonomous mode when the driver is present and
can take control of the vehicle almost immediately.
Moreover, when another tractor is driving ahead in the
field, a delay in vehspd can result in delayed deceleration
and thus collision of the two vehicles. However, in
case of no additional vehicle ahead delay deviation
in vehspd would be still critical but, would not have
collision as an outcome. Therefore, while performing
hazard analysis, we take the operational mode of the
vehicle and its context into consideration as it aids in an
in-depth analysis of the consequences of the deviations
in services.
Step IV. Safety Statuses and Corresponding
Measures: Subsequent to hazard identification, we
estimate the risk associated with the deviations and
assign them a corresponding integrity levels. Since
we have an autonomous agricultural vehicle, we do
the risk estimation in accordance with standard ISO
25119 [7] and consider the parameters: Severity of the
accident caused by the deviation, the likelihood of the
accident and the controllability of the situation to assign
agricultural performance levels (AgPL) from ’a’ to ’e’
[9] for different levels of risk.
〈if SafStatus⇒ SafMeasure〉 ∈ SRule (4)
Following the AgPL assignment, the very last step is
to construct safety statuses (SafStatus) for the safety
rule (SRule). Each status acts like a condition which
when true, indicates the vehicle being in an unsafe state
and thereby, triggers a corresponding countermeasure
(SafMeasure). Equation 5 is an exemplar safety rule for
TIA-Baling system. In case of a delay in front obstacle
sensor signal, all autonomous configurations, for Trac,
Bal and SwSc, are reconfigured to semi-autonomous
mode.
〈if (FObstSignal delay ≤ 400ms while V Speed ≥ 15)
⇒ (AutoCf1 to SemiAutoCf1)〉 ∈ SRule1
(5)
During the TIA case study, we observed that not all
deviations, despite being in the safety critical services,
result in hazardous situations. These are the deviations
that are either improbable to occur or are easily
controllable and thus, have a corresponding AgPl of
’a’ or below (QM). We filter such deviations and
consider the ones that have AgPL ’b’ or higher for the
safety statuses. Besides, we realised that creating safety
statuses and an equivalent corrective measure for each
individual service would result in a safety rule explosion.
Especially, when the number of safety critical services
is higher. Moreover, there exist certain associations
between the some services where, a particular deviation
in one along with a certain deviation in the other,
in a specific operational mode, results in a hazardous
situation with potentially catastrophic consequences.
To this end, a safety rule consists of a safety status
that represent an unsafe state of the vehicle caused either
due to individual service deviation or a deviation due
to the associated services having an AgPL of ’b’ or
above, in a particular operational mode during a specific
scenario. As a safety measure, we reconfigure the system
to a configuration that brings the system back to a safe
state. For each safety status, safety measure is a set of
potential configurations that the vehicle can configure to.
At runtime, the currently activated configuration as well
as the other potential configurations are evaluated using
a complexity based risk metrics [10].
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper presented a stepwise specification for a
service safety monitor, a sub-module of a safety monitor,
that administers an autonomous vehicle for safety
critical deviations during its execution. The monitor is a
collection of safety rules obtained by performing hazard
and risk analysis at design time. We believe that for
distributed autonomous system like TIA, such a safety
monitor not only aids in achieving fault tolerance by
prompting safety measures in form of reconfiguration,
but aids in self-awareness and allows it to adapt its
behavior to sustain a safe behavior at runtime.
Presently we are implementing the monitor in
autonomous vehicles in the agricultural and road
vehicle domain. As future work, we plan to explore
the benefits and tackle challenges associated with its
implementation and validation. Escalating complexity of
safety rules owing to higher dependencies among and
due to increasing amount of system services, structural
decisions like centralized or decentralized monitor for
the system with regards to functional and non-functional
properties like performance and efficiency and validation
of the monitor itself are one of the many challenges to
be investigated systematically as a part of our research.
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